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CROOKED BUSINESS, ENRON STYLE
Kristopher Kehner†
Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron.
By Mimi Schwartz and Sherron Watkins.
Doubleday, 2003. 386 pages. $26.00.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ken Lay, Jeffery Skilling, and Andy Fastow were all rich and
powerful executives at Enron. Then Enron imploded in a truth-isstranger-than-fiction corporate scandal. But what do we really
know about the inside culture at Enron; the personalities of Lay,
Skilling, and Fastow; and the specifics of the scandal? In the book,
1
Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron, the reader is
treated to an inside look at the events, culture, and personalities
behind the scandal. In the wake of the Enron scandal, the federal
government has taken actions to prevent Enron-like disasters, and
2
many Enron executives have scurried to avoid legal culpability.
II. THE ENRON STORY AS TOLD IN POWER FAILURE:
LAY, SKILLING, AND FASTOW
The authors of Power Failure do an excellent job of telling the
Enron Story. To truly understand the changes in the law, it helps
† J.D. Candidate 2004, William Mitchell College of Law; B.S. Biochemistry,
University of Minnesota, magna cum laude, 2000. Thank you John and Rose—
without your support and encouragement my law school journey would not have
been possible.
1. MIMI SCHWARTZ & SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE: THE INSIDE STORY
OF THE COLLAPSE OF ENRON (Doubleday 2003). Co-author Sherron Watkins had
eight years as an Enron insider. Id. at 362.
2. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C.,
and 29 U.S.C.) (enhancing public disclosures, conflict-of-interest laws, and
criminal punishment for white-collar crime). In fact, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
called for an investigation into investment banks and used Enron’s transactions as
an example. Id. § 705(a)(1).
1581
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to know the underlying story of Enron. The authors of Power
Failure brilliantly describe the rise and fall of the major players in
the Enron scandal: Lay, Skilling, and Fastow.
Lay is portrayed as a person more interested in rubbing
3
4
shoulders with politicians and performing philanthropy than with
running Enron. With Lay not interested in the nuts and bolts
business of Enron, COO Rich Kinder was left to run the
5
corporation. Kinder wanted the CEO job when Lay left, which he
6
assumed would happen in 1996. When Lay renewed as CEO in
7
8
1996, Kinder left. In his absence, Jeff Skilling was made COO.
One of the most insightful but less-known happenings of the
Enron scandal was the internal power struggle between Skilling and
9
Rebecca Mark. Mark was “a deal maker.” Lay, as was most people,
was impressed with Mark, and Lay saw her as a possible
10
replacement for himself when he stepped down. Because Skilling
11
wanted Lay’s CEO job, Skilling saw Mark as a threat. In an effort
to push her out, Skilling planted an attorney named Amanda
12
Martin to keep an eye on Mark.
Skilling used Martin’s
13
information to point out the weaknesses in Mark’s projects. The
14
authors described this as “Mark walk[ing] blithely into a trap . . . .”
15
However, the trap was merely running a business.
While I
thought the authors went too far in romanticizing Mark with this
language, I understood why Mark was forced out of Enron—
survival of the meanest. When the business Mark ran foundered,

3. See SCHWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 24, 120, 196. “Lay[,] . . . with
powerful allies[,] handpicked [a congressman’s] replacement.” Id. at 196.
4. See id. at 195. Enron gave to museums and had the baseball field of the
Houston Astros named Enron Field. See id. Further, “Lay became a hero to the
African American community . . . a godfather to local black businessmen.” Id. at
195-96. Of course, with all this philanthropy, it is no surprise that Lay claims to
have no knowledge of the shenanigans that went on at Enron. See Matt Daily,
Enron’s Ken Lay Denies Wrongdoing (Jan. 19, 2004), at http://www.namibian.
com.na/2004/january/marketplace/041C50118F.html (last visited May 15, 2004).
5. See SCHWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 36.
6. See id. at 99.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 106-07.
10. See id. at 108, 117.
11. See id. at 107-08.
12. See id. at 109.
13. See id. at 110, 116-17.
14. Id. at 198.
15. See id. at 198-99.
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16

she was fired.
With this type of infighting, it is no surprise that people like
Andy Fastow came into power. Fastow has come to embody all that
was wrong with Enron, a point that came across powerfully in Power
Failure. Fastow worked his way up the ranks of Enron and became
17
one of Skilling’s favorites.
Despite failing at running his first
18
division, Fastow rededicated himself to Enron in an attempt to
19
keep his job.
Fastow realized that “no one at Enron seemed to care how he
20
had financed [a project] . . . .” Being desperate to keep his job,
Fastow began creating special-purpose entities that essentially
21
created a loan that does not show up as debt on the balance sheet.
These special-purpose entities required a third party to buy three
percent of the entity, thereby making the third party the owner, but
allowed Enron to run the entity and own the other ninety-seven
percent of the entity, essentially keeping the benefits of ownership
22
without any of the downsides. Of course, the third-party investor
23
stood to make millions of dollars on relatively small investments.
The authors of Power Failure were most impressive when they
described these complex financial transactions—they put these
extremely complex business deals into understandable terms.
Unfortunately for Enron, these special-purpose entities were
24
what finally caused the ultimate collapse of the corporation. The
special-purpose entity agreements contained a clause that called for
acceleration of the debt if their bond grade dropped below
25
investment grade. That debt was never reported on the balance
26
sheets. The $3.9 billion of off-balance sheet debt was triggered
when the grade of the bonds fell below investment grade, forcing
27
Enron into bankruptcy.
A more shocking allegation in Power Failure was that Fastow
16. See id. at 200. It is not as though Mark was left out in the cold; she sold
her Enron stock for $80 million. See id.
17. See id. at 151-52.
18. See id. at 157.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 159.
21. See id. at 160.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 163.
24. See id. at 330, 339.
25. See id. at 330.
26. See id. at 160.
27. See id. at 339.
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engaged in many conflict-of-interest transactions. Enron needed a
third party to invest $11 million to make the three percent to form
28
a special-purpose entity.
Fastow volunteered to make the $11
million investment and to make himself owner of the specialpurpose entity, despite being a senior executive at Enron, a clear
29
conflict of interest. Skilling, much to his credit, denied Fastow’s
30
Fastow decided to put one of his cronies, Michael
request.
Kopper, in charge of the special-purpose entity; Kopper was not
senior management, but was an Enron employee. That fact would
31
not have to be stated on Enron’s proxy statements. The board
32
approved the deal. Skilling made Fastow Enron’s CFO in 1998 as
33
a result of these transactions because he got the job done. After
he was made CFO, Fastow finally got what he wanted—he was made
34
the “outside” owner of two special-purpose entities.
In addition, other Enron employees participated in behavior
35
that would appall most people. Successful men degraded women.
36
Enron
There were also many excesses from the executives.
executives mocked executives from other corporations because
37
they believed the other executives were losers. Altogether, Enron
38
considered its own lack of professionalism as a bit of a joke.
III. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AS A RESPONSE
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was the government’s response
to Enron-like corporate scandals. It is interesting to ponder
whether the changes in the law would have prevented the Enron
scandal as described in Power Failure. While certain provisions of
SOX are discussed below, it is important to remember that there
39
are several other provisions of SOX that relate to Enron.
28. See id. at 161.
29. See id. at 162.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 163. The board minutes showed that Kopper’s involvement was
not discussed. Id.
33. See id. at 164.
34. See id. at 172-73. The board approved this transaction and waived any
conflict of interest. See id.
35. See id. at 79. Ken Rice talked about how he wished Rebecca Mark’s breasts
were larger. See id. at 194.
36. See id. at 193-96.
37. See id. at 8.
38. See id. at 79.
39. See § 302, 116 Stat. at 777 (certification of SEC reports by officers); § 304,
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In response to the special-purpose entities that brought Fastow
to power, Congress and the President ordered a General
Accounting Office (GAO) Study in SOX of special-purpose
40
entities and the investment banks that helped Enron structure
41
these deals. Before Enron, federal financial regulators did not
42
consider these special-purpose entities to be high risk; however,
after the Enron scandal, federal regulators will take a closer look at
43
Merely taking a “closer look” at Enron is
these transactions.
dubious because, with the amount of power that Enron executives
had, it is doubtful that a closer look by the government would have
stopped Fastow.
Additionally, SOX added conflict-of-interest provisions to
prevent directors and officers from Enron-like conflict-of-interest
transactions by requiring directors, officers, and owners of ten
percent or more of a corporation to report that fact to the SEC
44
(Securities and Exchange Commission).
For example, Fastow
would have been required to report his interest in the specialpurpose entities that he owned because he was an officer at Enron.
While this sounds good and is a step in the right direction, the
conflict-of-interest transactions involving Kopper would not have to
be reported to the SEC because Kopper was not an officer or a
board member and did not own at least ten percent of the
securities. To catch special-purpose entities, Congress should cast a
wider net that requires people like Kopper to report to the SEC.
Further, SOX requires issuers of certain securities to have
either a code of ethics for their chief financial officers or an
45
explanation of why the corporation does not have a code.
Therefore, CFOs like Andy Fastow would be required to adhere to
a code of ethics if Enron had one. While it is questionable whether
Fastow would have adhered to such a code, SOX allows a
corporation not to adopt a code of ethics if the corporation has a
116 Stat. at 778 (forfeiture of certain bonuses and profits by officers); § 807, 116
Stat. at 804 (criminal penalties for fraud of investors in publicly traded
companies).
40. See id. § 401(c), 116 Stat. at 786.
41. See id. § 705(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 799.
42. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INVESTMENT BANKS: THE ROLE OF FIRMS
AND THEIR ANALYSTS WITH ENRON AND GLOBAL CROSSING 5-6 (March 2003), available
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03511.pdf (last visited May 15, 2004).
43. See id. at 6.
44. See § 403(a)(1), 116 Stat. at 788 (amending section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934).
45. See id. § 406(a), 116 Stat. at 789.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [2004], Art. 11
KEHNER- READY.DOC

1586

5/20/2004 9:44 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:4

reason for that decision. I can see no reason why a corporation
should not have a code of ethics for its CFO because the CFO is a
fiduciary position, like a lawyer, and lawyers have an extensive
46
ethical code.
If SOX had been in place during the Enron scandal, the
results of the scandal may have been different; however, I doubt
the difference would have been substantial.
IV. ENRON EXECUTIVES’ LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
Fastow, Kopper, and Skilling are in hot water because of the
conflict-of-interest and special-purpose entity transactions. Fastow
was sentenced to ten years in prison and forced to pay back more
47
than $23 million. Kopper had to pay back $12 million and can
48
never be an officer or director of a public company.
Most
recently, Skilling was charged with fraud in violation of federal
49
securities law. However, Lay claims that he “had no knowledge of
Enron’s ‘special purpose entities’ that Fastow created . . .
illegally . . . or that Fastow . . . [was] siphoning money into [his]
50
own pocket[].”
While Lay’s claims of innocence, and Skilling’s to a lesser
51
extent, appear to be supported by the book, these claims seem
hollow. First, both were top executives and board members, which
46. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (2004); MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2004).
47. See U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SEC SETTLES CIVIL FRAUD
CHARGES FILED AGAINST ANDREW S. FASTOW, FORMER ENRON CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICER, ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING RELEASE NO. 1942, LITIGATION RELEASE No.
18543 (Jan. 14, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/
lr18543.htm (last visited May 15, 2004).
48. See SEC CHARGES A FORMER HIGH-RANKING ENRON OFFICIAL WITH FRAUD,
ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING RELEASE NO. 1617, LITIGATION RELEASE NO. 17692 (Aug.
21, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17692.htm (last
visited May 15, 2004).
49. See SEC CHARGES JEFFREY K. SKILLING, ENRON’S FORMER PRESIDENT, CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, WITH FRAUD, ACCOUNTING AND
AUDITING ENFORCEMENT RELEASE NO. 1959, LITIGATION RELEASE No. 18582 (Feb. 19,
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18582.htm (last
visited May 15, 2004).
50. Matt Daily, Enron’s Ken Lay Denies Wrongdoing, THE FREE PRESS OF NAMIBIA,
Jan. 19, 2004, available at http://www.namibian.com.na/2004/january/
marketplace/041C50118F.html (last visited May 15, 2004).
51. According to the book, Lay seemed more interested in the public face of
Enron, not running the business. See SCHWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 24,
196, 120, 195. This is more consistent with a CEO who does not know what other
members of upper management are doing.
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meant that they signed off on Fastow’s transactions which included
the special-purpose entities and conflict-of-interest transactions.
Second, Lay, as CEO, is responsible for the people under him,
52
especially since Lay admits that he trusted Fastow. While Skilling
may have had no idea about the specific details of Fastow’s
schemes, Skilling has some level of culpability because he chose to
turn the other way and was not concerned about how the
transactions were completed.
Additionally, the punishment of Fastow and Kopper is
inadequate because Fastow and the Enron executives took away so
much from so many people. For example, Diana Peters, a former
Enron employee, lost $75,000 in her 401(k), her pension, her
53
health insurance, and her job when Enron went under. A short
time after losing her job and health insurance, Peters’ husband was
54
diagnosed with a brain tumor. This is in addition to the stigma of
being an ex-Enron employee looking for a job in a tight job
market, even though most employees did nothing wrong. The
losses of the rank-and-file employees can be contrasted against the
twenty members of upper-level management who received seventyfive percent of the $55 million set aside for severance pay for Enron
55
employees before Enron declared bankruptcy.
V. CONCLUSION
Power Failure provides interesting insight into Enron and the
legislation following the Enron scandal. While the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act is certainly a good start to preventing more Enrons, it does not
go far enough in certain respects. The problems manifested in
Power Failure are still possible because no act of Congress can
address the underlying issue of the occasional crooked corporate
officer or director. While some social commentary suggests that
56
the problem is pervasive, I believe that it is rare. Simply put,
investors need more protections, like SOX, to weed out crooked
officers and directors.
52. See id. at 311.
53. Mike
von
Fremd,
One-Sided
Deal
(Jan.
8,
2004),
at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/Business/Enron_pleadeal_reaction040108.
html (last visited May 15, 2004).
54. Id.
55. See SCHWARTZ & WATKINS, supra note 1, at 342-43.
56. See John LeBoutillier, A Culture of Lying: Jeff Skilling and the Entire Enron
Mess, ETHERZONE, Feb. 20, 2002, at http://www.etherzone.com/2002/lebo022002.
shtml (last visited May 15, 2004).
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